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dionysios demetis
Introduction
All around the world criminal activity remains at the forefront of govern-
mental concerns, not only as a problem that distorts the very fabric of
society within the conﬁnes of national jurisdictions, but also as a problem
that cuts across national borders to exhibit a global dimension.1 The
international dimension of criminal activity remains critical and is gener-
ally characterized by a complexity that is unique and requires action on
many different levels.2 Criminals set out to mask their illegal activities and
deliberately generate complexity as a means of concealment. In doing so,
they exploit new developments in technology that assist them in achieving
their ends. This criminality exhibits forms of innovation that stretch far
beyond traditional criminal activity (e.g., drug and human trafﬁcking) and
manages to attach itself within the broader fabric of society by exploiting
the very latest developments.3 This evolution is necessary as criminals seek
not only to escape arrest, prosecution and conviction, but also to enjoy the
fruits of their criminality (mostly ﬁnancial gains). Thus, they seek to
develop ways of exploiting the various diffuse norms of social interaction
(e.g., trust), ﬁnancial modes of conduct (e.g., cash-based economies),
technological and communication developments (e.g., Internet), and
thereby minimize the possibility for detection. By limiting the resources
that can be made available for prevention (or making them obsolete when
1 J. Wolfensohn, ‘Making the World a Better and Safer Place: The Time for Action Is Now’,
(2002) 22 Politics 118.
2 S. Mohamed, ‘Legal Instruments to Combat Money Laundering in the EU Financial
Market’, (2002) 6 Journal of Money Laundering Control 66.
3 J Haines and P Johnstone, ‘Global Cybercrime: New Toys for Money Launderers’, (1998) 2
Journal of Money Laundering Control 317.
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developing new criminal behaviour), they participate in this co-evolution
actively; and this they achieve by generating complexity.
This dynamic is nothing really new, but the central role that technology
has acquired in modern societies, particularly in the last decade, requires a
more thorough look at how the spectrum of serious criminality changes in
light of these developments. A more thorough investigation is also required
in order to better understand how technology can be used to facilitate
cooperation between different jurisdictions. Here another important issue
is raised: in the ﬁght against serious international crime, such as terrorism,
or cross-border tax evasion, nation states have launched a number of
initiatives for which citizen data are being stored in a centralized manner;
jeopardizing this data can produce tremendous consequences and create
adverse conditions leading to yet more crime. For instance, in the UK, two
DVDs that contained a full copy of HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC)
entire data of child beneﬁts were lost en route to theNational AuditOfﬁce in
an unrecorded and unregistered package. The lost data affected 25 million
people in the UK and jeopardized names, addresses, dates of birth of
children, along with National Insurance numbers and bank details of their
parents. Ultimately, this has exposed an entire generation to identity fraud.
Should we treat these failures as singularities or as systemic occurrences for
any large-scale centralized data project? The latter possibility seams more
plausible due to the complexity behind these projects.4
In India, a project is underway to collect biometric data for the entire
population with the aim of thwarting tax avoidance and corruption and
securing a single identiﬁcation scheme for the population. The government
promotes the project, not only as a means to tackle corruption and tax
evasion, but also as a way to provide particular beneﬁts to the population
from government funds and also gain access to banking services.While this
massive effort seems to display a near complete disregard for the security
risks related to the storage of biometric data in centralized databases,5 it does
4 After much debate in the House of Commons and the House of Lords, the biometric-
enabled identity card scheme for the UK was halted for both ﬁnancial reasons as well as
doubts about the security of the systems and their potential effect to curb criminal activity
by getting a ﬁrm grip on individual identity. See LSE, ‘The Identity Project’, Department of
Information Systems, London School of Economics, (2005), available at http://csrc.lse.ac.
uk/IDcard/default.htm.
5 A very useful report to look at comes from the Future of Identity in the Information
Society (FIDIS), which has examined the relationship between the Public Key Infrastruc-
ture and Biometrics. More can be found in the report: M. Gasson, M. Meints and
K. Warwick (eds.), ‘D3.2: A Study on Pki and Biometrics’, (FIDIS, 2005) at 1–138.
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demonstrate that technology is at the top of government agendas in an effort
to bridge control of identity with ﬁnancial crime (as well as other trans-
national crimes). This irresistible fusion between technology and tackling
criminality is very important. It is usually predicated upon the assumed
thesis of benevolent effects of technological systems, without taking into
account the side effects that are created by a new class of antitheses. In such
circumstances, technological implementations create unintended uses, vio-
lations, misuses and unpredictable behaviour.6
Hence, the handling of information through technology-based systems
gives rise to a domain that is becoming more and more central to the
development of coordinated action in tackling criminal activity at both
national and international levels: the domain of Information Systems
(IS), in particular, the role they occupy across various subsystems that
focus on tackling criminal behaviour.
IS are considered tools that can be harnessed for both preventing and
detecting criminal activity; and, indeed, they have found a number of
applications at national and international levels. IS are generally recog-
nized as important catalysts for progress and transformation and there
may be good reasons why IS are seen as critical in the ﬁght against crime:
they organize data in structured ways, while the character of automation
embodied in these technologies is perceived as an enabler that allows for
rapid data processing and swift communication between stakeholders. It
is believed that this combination of automation/communication can
prove critical in tackling criminal activity across national borders.
In addition to the communication possibilities opened up by modern
technology, advances in data storage have led, and continue to lead, to
long-term storage of large datasets.7 This creates vastly different dynam-
ics in the way data can be manipulated from small-scale technological
installations as data sharing magniﬁes the phenomenon. The mass of
data available can be used to infer characteristics for certain types of
behavioural patterns, from which general proﬁles can be created that
encapsulate an abstraction of criminal behaviour. By abstracting such
behaviour and subsequently applying its characteristics to future data,
one is – in theory – able to estimate the probability of an individual
6 I. Angell, The New Barbarian Manifesto: How to Survive the Information Age (London:
Kogan Page, 2000); I. Angell, ‘As I See It: Enclosing Identity’, (2008) 1 Identity in the
Information Society 23.
7 C. Apte, B. Liu, E. Pednault and P. Smyth, ‘Business Applications of Data Mining’, (2002)
45 Communications of the ACM 49.
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committing a crime. It is worth pointing out that the digital traces of
individuals unrelated to particular criminal activity are also parties to this
process. Their contribution lies in simply providing more and more data
that can be used to infer how ‘normal behaviour’ can be categorized and
clustered according to different age groups and various other demo-
graphics. Against the backdrop of this supposed normality, suspicious
behaviour can be ﬂagged and then further analysed, as will subsequently
be explored with the use of illustrations regarding money laundering. The
effectiveness of this process remains to be examined in more detail. At
this stage, it is worth pointing out that the role of IS is not only enabling,
by supporting solutions for the problem of criminality and augmenting
traditional efforts by automating processes or providing further intelli-
gence, but also constraining in ways that are often subtle and interfere
with regulatory intentions. Technology creates bottom-up effects that
sometimes counteract top-down impositions.8 Unintended consequences
come into play, despite the strict logical paths upon which technological
operations are executed.
On the basis of the context brieﬂy discussed above, this chapter
investigates how IS exert inﬂuence in preventing and detecting criminal
activity. First, the phenomenon of data growth is analysed, as it is central
to the problems that are created when there is an effort to proﬁle
suspicious behaviour. Through a series of properties, data require
processing, manipulation, categorization and analysis. Second, two key
concepts are presented that are very important in pondering the greater
role of IS. They are at the core of manipulating large datasets, namely
proﬁling and data mining. These are examined from a non-technical
perspective in order to highlight how they are being used as techniques
for spotting suspicious behaviour and how data are being used to proﬁle,
algorithmically manipulate and distil actionable information for prevent-
ing criminal behaviour. Third, the majority of the chapter focuses on
the domain of money laundering for highlighting the interaction between
technology and the detection and prevention of criminal activity.
Reference to the anti-money laundering (AML) domain is helpful in
considering both how technology is being used as an early warning
mechanism in order to ﬂag suspicious activity, and how the development
of group/individual proﬁles that simulate money laundering behaviour
have important side effects.
8 D. Demetis, Technology and Anti-Money Laundering: A Systems Theory and Risk-Based
Approach (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010).
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By extrapolating from the issues identiﬁed above, a theoretical frame-
work is presented at the end of this chapter that addresses the inﬂuence
of technology on tackling criminal activity and considers the information
dimensions for monitoring criminality. Peripheral, yet important, issues
are factored into the considerations of this framework and include how
criminal activity can be balanced with civil liberties, as well as the potential
for using Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) for (partly-) anonym-
ous data sharing between stakeholders at an international level.
Data growth, databases and the algorithmic construction
of criminal behaviour
Current criminal activity is unfolding (in both its cyber and real-world
dimensions) and characterizes our information age. Governments, intel-
ligence agencies, police authorities and other organizations or stakehold-
ers have at their disposal an unprecedented amount of data to prevent or
detect criminal activity. Making sense of this data is the challenge at
hand; and it is no easy task.
Every year we produce a staggering volume of data, equivalent to
about 37,000 libraries the size of the US Library of Congress.9 Most of
these data are unstructured from a computational perspective, meaning
they are not tied to a speciﬁc coherent database structure. We create
text-based data in word processing, presentations, numerical data in
spreadsheets, communicate by exchanging emails, publish tweets, pro-
duce (or become subjects of ) audio recordings, digital pictures and full
motion video, while at the same time participating in social networks on
the Internet and other forms of web-based communication. In equal
measure the various industrial actors produce or store their own sets of
data, thus giving rise to different industry-speciﬁc data categories partici-
pating in the growing pool of data. For example, the medical industry
creates medical data such as MRI, or the ﬁnancial sector stores raw
transaction datasets created by individual ﬁnancial transactions, thereby
recording the movement of money. More and more data are being
created year on year. These data are stored on paper, ﬁlm, magnetic or
optical storage and ﬂow through broadcasts, telephony and the Internet.
Massive as the volume of data may be, they constitute the raw material
that is being monitored, used, analysed, categorized and ﬁltered for
9 P. Lyman and H. Varian, ‘How Much Information 2003?’ (2003), available at www2.sims.
berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/.
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various reasons. To an extreme level, the volume of data becomes the
subject of indiscriminate massive monitoring by intelligence agencies
(national security agencies). The approach that has been suggested by
the US National Security Agency (NSA) director, General Keith
B. Alexander, is to ‘collect the whole haystack rather than look for a
single needle in the haystack; collect it all, tag it, store it . . . and whatever
it is you want, you go searching for it’.10
Crime detection and prevention are key concerns that have always made
use of various forms of data. Therefore, while there could be an obvious
information value in this pool of data for crime detection and prevention, it
is the set of consequences that emerge from utilizing data that is fascinating
to explore. These consequences create severe side effects, not only on data
subjects that may be under investigation, but also on ‘future suspects’ that
will be ﬁltered through the exploitation of data. At an ontological level, a
much deeper effect percolates, as the dimensions of criminality are being
constructed through technology. Legislation may be regulating the top-
down imposition by deﬁning the nature of behavioural activities that can
be categorized as criminal (and the penalties for engaging in such activities),
but technologymaintains the infrastructure through which suspicious cases
are advanced and given priority over others.Moreover, the sheer complexity
of the operations involved at a computational level implies that the full
extent of these processes cannot always become visible.
Technology acts in a bottom-up fashion and often in contradistinction
to the function of legislation that sets the norms through which crimin-
ality is interpreted. By automating complex processes, technology also
carves a different space in establishing a systemic role. In turn, these
elements mutate into new social forms. They are transformed into new
conditions which take the form of an infrastructural reorganization in the
shape of electronic information.11
Algorithms create the logical platform through which suspicious
behaviour is deconstructed and encapsulated. Machines provide the
technical infrastructure upon which automated operations are under-
taken and communicated. And humans are called upon to validate or
discard the technologically constructed suspicious behaviour. The last
10 E. Nakashima and J. Warrick, ‘For NSA Chief, Terrorist Threat Drives Passion to “Collect
It All,” Observers Say’, (2013), available at www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/for-nsa-chief-terrorist-threat-drives-passion-to-collect-it-all/2013/07/14/
3d26ef80-ea49–11e2-a301-ea5a8116d211_story.html.
11 J. Kallinikos, The Consequences of Information: Institutional Implications of Technological
Change (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2006).
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stage in this process (i.e., human intervention) maintains the illusion that
human judgement intervenes to establish a control mechanism for what
is being automatically generated. However, this ignores a complex
stratum of technical interconnections that yield unpredictable results.
Technology acquires a systemic role that functions in an unpredictable
manner, not because at the micro-level the results of speciﬁc operations
cannot be predicted with accuracy, but because at the macro-level the
system of technology acquires such a degree of complexity that it is
impossible to monitor all the interactions that take place at the level of
the system.12 At the same time, it is impossible to predict how the
interactions between different algorithms will affect the platforms that
support them, or how their interactions will play out over time.
An illustration, among many others, can be found in the ﬁnancial
markets. In what is known as ‘the crash of 2:45’, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average recorded the biggest one-day point decline in its history (998.5
points) due to automatic computerized traders on the stock market
engaging in ‘algorithmic trading’, where the automated execution of
orders without human intervention led to an unpredictable level of
withdrawing from the stock market, thereby creating liquidity prob-
lems.13 This incident was meant to illustrate the unpredictable systemic
nature of large-scale automated operations, thereby indicating that tech-
nology is not subordinate in the causal sense. It gains an autonomous
character that goes against social and legal norms, as the processes that
support technology feed off each other in unpredictable ways. Such
processes tend to create ‘positive feedback loops’ that have a tendency
to destabilize the system from what an observer would consider as a
predictable state.14 Moreover, in the context of dealing with criminality,
the embodiment of human working practices into technologically sup-
ported processes means that the nature of work in the ﬁght against
transnational (and other forms of ) criminality has changed drastically,
particularly when international collaboration is demanded.
While the communicative role of technology has established a faster
and better way to support the communication between authorities in
12 N. Luhmann, Social Systems, Writing Science (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995)
at iii, 627; N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System (Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004) at viii, 498.
13 T. Hendershott, C. Jones and A. Menkveld, ‘Does Algorithmic Trading Improve
Liquidity?’(2001) 11 Journal of Finance 1.
14 N. Glass, ‘Chaos, Non-Linear Systems and Day-to-Day Management’, (1996) 14
European Management Journal 98.
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different countries, there is yet another role that technology acquires.
This is primarily concerned with the development of techniques for
understanding the nature of criminality with a view to developing mech-
anisms that facilitate the proﬁling of criminal behaviour. This is usually
based upon a series of techniques, such as statistical analyses of datasets
with crime-related information, geographic mapping of hotspots where
criminal activity takes place, economic or other indicators which may
suggest that a rise in criminality is about to occur, and so on. This
exercise in ﬁguring out how criminal behaviour presents itself in different
contexts is an important one, but the role of technology therein is largely
underestimated. Technology is not only applied to delineate certain
patterns of criminal activity/behaviour by shifting large volumes of data.
Once that process is over, it is assumed that the results achieved have a
near-causal developmental link to the processes that gave rise to them.
Put simply, it is assumed that this is ‘what criminality looks like’. The
next step seems to follow almost naturally, but the leap is signiﬁcant.
Once we have what we believe to be the fundamental building blocks of a
criminal phenomenon (in how/when it occurs, what we should be
looking for to observe as early signs for future criminal behaviour, etc.)
then we can apply this ‘pattern’ (or series thereof ) to new data that are
either real-time or near real-time data (or within a certain timeframe)
and reduce this new volume of data to a few suspicious cases that could
be examined more closely.
This process has nothing to do with the search for a unique suspect
who has committed a crime (either at a national level or through
international cooperation) or a network of criminals. It is not a process
through which criminals are uniquely identiﬁed, but it becomes a process
where potential criminals are singled out for further investigation because
they ﬁt a set of abstract characteristics. These characteristics have been
deduced, not only by analysing previous criminal cases, but also by using
various other data sources. The process of discovering patterns in large
datasets is the overall goal of data mining.15
The fact that this constitutes some type of ‘pre-emptive strike’ against
criminality is one element to the process: the one that allows us to
simulate and prevent. But the much deeper effect is usually side-lined
and not considered at all. This is what, in this author’s contention, can be
described as the technological construction of criminality. In a sense, and
15 S.-O. Tergan and T. Keller, Knowledge and Information Visualization: Searching for
Synergies, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Berlin, New York: Springer, 2005).
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in the ‘eyes of algorithms’ where pattern is king, the results of the
applications of ﬁlters for criminal activity, yield outputs that are already
considered as highly possible criminal cases. This algorithmic prejudice
inﬂicted upon the subsequent human evaluation must be taken into
serious consideration. As we shall see in the paradigm devoted to AML
technology, this has had serious side effects that hinder both national and
international efforts in combating the phenomenon.
Reliance on technology for supporting processes that tackle criminality
is not only to be found in the communicative role of IS. Technology
assumes a more important function as it becomes extensively used to
conduct proﬁling at a pre-criminal level, on the basis of data that are
stored from previous criminal cases. The institutionalization of these
processes creates an iron cage that treats possibility as suspicion.16
Through a series of self-referential processes more data leads to more
proﬁling and more suspects, but also to an elevated risk of being com-
pletely overwhelmed by the white noise that permeates these processes to
begin with. In turn, conducting manual checks becomes a painstaking
process; ultimately the checks become more costly and counterproduc-
tive, staff may become demoralized and prosecution rates remain low.
International cooperation is hindered at the national level as technology
places increasing demands on cooperation by simplifying communica-
tion. Requests on information for suspects need to be prioritized and the
technological modes of operation need to transcend the national in
support of the international cases that exhibit a greater degree of com-
plexity. But how has the technology shaped the international dimension
of cooperation against crime?
The role of information and technology-based systems
in the internationalization of policing
From a historical perspective, advances in technology were deemed to be
‘instrumental in facilitating the internationalization of policing in a form
that is independent of law and politics’.17 The evolution of technology
16 P. J. Dimaggio and W. W. Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism
and Collective Rationality in Organization Fields’, in W. W. Powell and P. J. Dimaggio
(eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1991).
17 M. Deﬂem, ‘Technology and the Internationalization of Policing: A Comparative-
Historical Perspective’, (2002) 19 Justice Quarterly 453.
200 demetis
Comp. by: Amoudha Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 7 Title Name: BANTEKASandMYLONAKI
Date:16/7/14 Time:19:19:06 Page Number: 201
has led towards cross-border cooperation because barriers to communi-
cation between institutions were rendered obsolete. Structural conditions
that had to be satisﬁed for the control of international crime were met,
for example, by establishing interoperability between systems, or by
agreeing on common standards such as methodologies for ﬁngerprint
measurements. IS pre-dating the information exchanges that were sup-
ported by computers (e.g., telegraphic code, radio communications,
printed publications) facilitated the early forms of data exchange. How-
ever, the evolution in communication, exchange and storage has been
phenomenal; and it is all down to the invention of the microchip, which
gave rise to what we can nowadays call a ‘computer’. This dynamic has
also been completely altered by the invention of the Internet, which
removes the locale of information and has a substantial impact on data
storage and availability.18
Of course, another issue that changes the scope of what data becomes
available through the Internet, remains the fact that users are willing to
put personal information online, including their locations, photographs,
personal preferences, education, age, work experience, activities, and a lot
more. This information is available immediately through the Internet
and constitutes an ever-growing platform of exploration for intelligence
purposes, exploration of social networks and extraction of statistics for
developing various models that can assist in understanding demograph-
ics, socio-economics, political implications and trends that may be con-
sidered as proxies to criminality. While it may not be immediately
evident how such data can be used to deal with criminality when they
are provided wittingly by non-offenders (in most cases), it needs to be
made clear that criminals are perceived as ‘anomalies’ within the broader
system. At least from an IS perspective, they may be viewed as exceptions
to the normality that non-offenders may exhibit in their digital traces. It
is in the distinction and the difference between criminal/non-criminal
that data manipulation rests, while both sides to a distinction19 are
necessary in order to examine the phenomenon and gain a deeper
understanding of how the ‘anomalies’ can be algorithmically traced or
how technology can assist in collaborative work between nations for this
purpose. Needless to say, privacy implications are very important also,
even though not the subject matter of this chapter; the potential misuse
18 J. Kim, ‘Phenomenology of Digital-Being’, (2001) 24 Human Studies 87.
19 N. Luhmann, Theories of Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).
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of data20 can create negative effects and cast serious doubt upon the
aggregated operations of both governments and companies, who are
bound to suffer from security breaches as no system can be considered
fully secure.21
Through automation, and propelled by it, data become the irresistible
source that must be harnessed in order to lead to action; data become a
source of pre-action. The question then becomes slightly different in the
context of tackling criminality. How can we ‘derive beneﬁts from this
increased data availability’?22 How can the anti-criminal value of infor-
mation be considered, both in light of the technological developments
and in the context of the internationalization of policing?
Forensic technologies are also considered under this prism: for
example, ﬁngerprints. While the collection of such biometrics constitutes
a physical process to begin with, the internationalization of their use in
policing has been facilitated by the deconstruction of a speciﬁc set of
information characteristics that describe the physical biometric. Inter-
operability in the methodology for measuring ﬁngerprints (i.e., agree-
ment on the unique measurements that will be taken) is necessary in
order to develop an infrastructure that will communicate the measure-
ments, or store the metrics in databases so that they can be shared or
searched more effectively. For example, in the case of ﬁngerprints, it is
not the image itself that is searched, rather the deduced mathematical
structure and numerical pattern that has been extracted from the
image.23 From an information science perspective, this becomes an
informational subset that needs to be manipulated. Information then
acquires another set of properties that become fundamental and abso-
lutely critical in characterizing the information age. The demands that
are placed by the increasing volume of information place further strain
on the functionality that needs to be powered by technology in order to
improve international cooperation. This requires more thorough forms
of international cooperation. For example, there needs to be an
20 C. Arndt, ‘The Loss of Privacy and Identity in the 21st Century: Causes and Possible
Solutions’, (June 2006) Biometric Technology Today 3.
21 G. Dhillon and J. Backhouse, ‘Information System Security Management in the New
Millennium’, (2000) 43 Communications of the ACM 125.
22 A. Gotlieb, C. Dalfen and K. Katz, ‘The Transborder Transfer of Information by Com-
munications and Computer Systems: Issues and Approaches to Guiding Principles’,
(1974) 68 American Journal of International Law 227.
23 U. Uludag, and A. K. Jain, ‘Attacks on Biometric Systems: A Case Study in Fingerprints’,
in Proc. SPIE-EI 2004 (San Jose, CA: 2004).
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agreement on information management, such as an agreement on the
categories that should be used in the semantic tagging of crimes through-
out different countries; otherwise, comparisons become meaningless and
inferences regarding the characteristics of crime are rendered unfounded.
Table 7.1 summarizes some of the key communication technologies
and developments that have been used in policing and tackling crime;
these have further transcended national borders to achieve some degree
of cooperation between nations.
By looking at Table 7.1 one can observe a main strand of development:
the communications/technological strand that allows for the establish-
ment of communication between different countries, much like the ﬁrst
telegraphic messages exchanged between the UK and the USA, leading to
the Internet, which allows for global communications nowadays. But
there is another strand with complimentary characteristics that refer
mostly to the storage and processing of data, such as the invention of
the microchip, leading to the development of both hardware and soft-
ware: the constituent components of the modern computer. Nowadays,
we have even got the application of anti-crime speciﬁc software, or tools
for supporting the collaborative work between countries aiming to pre-
vent or detect criminal activity.
In Table 7.1, the Internet is considered as the latest major development
as a medium for the communication of criminal cases, suspects, etc.,
between authorities. Moreover, the Internet is used as a communication
facilitator for data across national law enforcement agencies (LEAs) that
feed data into speciﬁc IS with structured databases.
Table 7.1: Evolution of communication systems in tackling crime
Time
horizon Information and communication technologies (ICTs) development
1850 Telegraph
1876 Telephone
1900s Radio communications
1924 Fingerprint measurements
1932 FBI inaugurates forensic laboratory
1940 Radar used in policing
1964 Facsimile
1970s Modern computers
1980s The Internet used as a medium for networking/communication and
replacing a lot of pre-existing functionality from other ICTs.
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When considering the internationalization of policing and the collab-
oration through which crime can be prevented and detected, the role of
the Internet cannot be stressed enough. Even though important security
concerns may be raised in the context of providing multiple cross-
national user access to crime-related data,24 particularly when suspect-
related data can be modiﬁed, the utility from deploying web-based
resources for tackling international crime remains extremely important.
The IS of Europol
Looking at how IS are being used at cross-border level it is pertinent to
describe brieﬂy the three core IS being used by Europol in order to
facilitate the exchange of information: the Europol Information System
(EIS), the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA),
as well as the Europol Platform for Experts (EPE).
The ﬁrst information system, the EIS, constitutes the ‘reference system
for offences, individuals involved and other related data to support
member states, Europol and its cooperation partners in their ﬁght against
organized crime, terrorism, and other forms of serious crime’.25 Europol
not only allows LEAs to transmit data into its systems, but also validates
and feeds data from third parties into the system, the majority of which is
inserted by means of automated data loading systems. As of December
2012, more than 185,000 data objects reside in its database, including
48,000 suspected or convicted criminals, a rise of 17 per cent compared
to 2011. About 34 per cent of the data objects relate to drug trafﬁcking,
while the major crime areas that are also identiﬁed include forgery of
money, robbery, illegal immigration and fraud. Member states transmit
data on entities that can be cross-matched, such as persons, cars, tele-
phone numbers and ﬁrearms. National LEAs both share and compare
data with the EIS. The EIS is being used when conducting investigations,
thereby acquiring a detection character, but it is also used as a reference
tool from which statistics, characteristics and inferences can be drawn,
thereby developing proﬁling tactics through which criminality can be
dissected into categories.
The SIENA system supports secure exchange of both operational and
strategic information related to crimes and it is an important information
24 Basel Committee, ‘Sharing of Financial Records between Jurisdictions in Connection with
the Fight against Terrorist Financing’, (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2002).
25 Europol, ‘Information Exchanges’, (2013) available at www.europol.europa.eu/content/
page/information-exchange-1848.
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exchange network in the context of tackling criminality at an inter-
national level. This becomes evident when one examines the initiation
of criminal cases; only 8 per cent are actually initiated by Europol itself.26
The majority are initiated by Member States (82 per cent) while the
remaining 10 per cent are undertaken by third parties that have cooper-
ation agreements in place with Europol, thus establishing a means of
international communication and cooperation in criminal cases. More
than 400,000 operational messages were exchanged through the SIENA
system between Member States, with more than 15,000 new cases initi-
ated. The majority of information exchanges between states involved
cases related to drugs (almost 30 per cent of all new cases), followed by
fraud (15 per cent), robbery (11 per cent), money laundering (9 per cent),
and illegal immigration (8 per cent).27 A number of different countries
collaborate in the SIENA system and of the total of sixty parties partici-
pating, twenty-seven are Member States.
Finally, exploiting the possibilities opened by collaborative tools in the
web sphere, Europol has developed a secure environment, the EPE. This
is meant to facilitate knowledge sharing between experts from different
jurisdictions in a secure platform where similarities, differences and
common practices can be discussed and improved. In this information
system no personal data are being used; the aim is to enable sharing of
suspect data between users on a variety of topics such as kidnapping,
child sexual exploitation, counter terrorism, corruption, environmental
crime, ﬁnancial crime, fraud, etc. More than 2,000 users have joined the
different expert online communities in the EPE.
The work undertaken by Europol illustrates that the use of technology
to facilitate information exchange between different jurisdictions is
multi-dimensional. Technology is used for a variety of purposes and
establishes links that assist both in preventing and detecting criminal
activity. Technology also allows the parties to gain distributed access to
the same digital entities: the digital objects that variously characterize
suspects for criminal activities. Distributed access through the
Internet allows for the internationalization of tackling criminality,28
while the aggregation of different digital objects into single platforms
allows for the emergence of collaboration as a critical factor. While all
26 Ibid.
27 Available at www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/europol-information-system-eis-1850.
28 G. Papanicolaou, Transnational Policing and Sex Trafﬁcking in Southeast Europe: Policing
the Imperialist Chain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
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these aspects appear to be positive in advancing the internationalization
of policing and the ﬁght against transnational crime, there is a dark side
to technological implementation. In addition, there are restrictions on
how far automation can be allowed to intrude into human decision-
making processes, even when these boundaries are constantly pushed
forward (and usually making more room for technology along the way).
Proﬁling data
Demands to cut down on the complexity generated by increased data
availability have led to a number of techniques that attempt to reach a
subset of these data, so that their manipulation can become more meaning-
ful in a speciﬁc context. This seems to come almost naturally, as it is
impossible to consume all the data that we have at our disposal in any given
situation. As human beings, this restricts us in a most fundamental way. Let
us take Google as an example. Behind a highly efﬁcient infrastructure that
swiftly ranks search results by using complex algorithms, lies a peculiar form
of proﬁling that becomes dependent on the search engine itself; human
proﬁling, namely proﬁling by human beings. The top thirty results from a
search receive over 90 per cent (!) of search trafﬁc.29 The capacity and
complexity of computational processing in such scenarios becomes vastly
undermined while the output of an algorithm is ﬁercely cut down by what
computer scientists may view as a necessary evil: human processing. There-
fore, computer proﬁling and human proﬁling become structurally coupled
and co-dependent. Advanced computations are irrelevant if they are decon-
textualized and human decision-making restrictions are not considered,
unless of course, computers are allowed in the future to become decision
makers instead of constructing part of the reality for decision makers. But
isn’t this technological interference already developing inﬂuential precondi-
tions upon which humans are called to exercise their judgement?
In proﬁling, the goals are to extrapolate and formulate a set of charac-
teristics (e.g., behavioural) about an individual, a collective entity, or even
a general phenomenon (e.g., money laundering); thereafter, this set of
characteristics (i.e., the proﬁle) is applied to other entities that are being
treated in light of these same characteristics.30 While in the ﬁeld of
29 B. Jansen and A. Spink, ‘An Analysis of Web Documents Retrieved and Viewed’, in The
Fourth International Conference on Internet Computing (Las Vegas, NV: 2003) at 65–9.
30 H. Hirsh, C. Basu and B. Davison, ‘Learning to Personalize’, (2000) 43 Communications
of the ACM, 102.
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information science proﬁling is considered a process with a number of
distinct stages, it needs to be acknowledged that the proﬁling process has
two key components which must be distinguished and which are central
to the extraction of ‘anti-criminal value from information’. The ﬁrst
concerns proﬁle generation, which is the process of inferring a proﬁle,
and involves analysing personal data in search of patterns, sequences and
relationships in order to arrive at a set of assumptions, while the second
relates to proﬁle application, which treats entities in light of this proﬁle.
The latter assists in decision making and more speciﬁcally in limiting the
number of results (or suspects in the context of criminality) so that the
remaining subset becomes meaningful to manipulate.
Hence, the need for proﬁling emerges from the need to cut down on
this complexity (or even just volume).
But what implications does this have for individuals? Firstly, the ‘use of
extensive data proﬁles by public or private institutions deprives the
individual of the capacity to inﬂuence decision making’,31 with decisions
being made on the basis of individual ‘data shadows’. Secondly, excessive
reliance on technological infrastructures or sophisticated software for
monitoring criminal behaviour may lead to human decision makers
abdicating their responsibilities. But the real issue here is to deﬁne the
essential characteristics of a decision taken by computer software.
According to Bygrave: ‘. . .a negative answer would say that software
cannot actually make a decision because mental action is required . . .
an afﬁrmative answer would say that the logical processes of computer
software would seem to parallel sufﬁciently the processes of the human
mind to justify treating the former as analogous to the latter’.32 The
afﬁrmative answer also implies that human activity is always involved,
even if he/she is not part of the process as he/she is responsible for
programming the software.
The major ﬂaw in the afﬁrmative position is that the collective actions
embedded within the technology cannot be monitored due to an emer-
gent complexity. It must be understood that to attribute a singular
intentionality to particular artefacts or technologies:
simpliﬁes the complex texture of technologically embodied functionalities
(because the intentions of many groups are mingled in the design and
31 L. Bygrave, ‘Automated Proﬁling; Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data
Protection Directive and Automated Proﬁling’, (2001) 17 Computer Law & Security
Report 17.
32 Ibid. (emphasis added).
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development process) . . . and that technology inﬂuences human agency
not by imposing a single and mechanical functionality but by inviting
speciﬁc courses of action, courses of action that are engraved by the
distinctive way by which each technology frames its reference domain.33
In the context of tackling criminality there has been a tremendous
increase in the frequency and intensity of proﬁling practices.34 An
emergent industry has grown out of this, building upon a number of
techniques such as data warehousing and data mining. Software that is
speciﬁcally designed to assist in investigations comes in various forms,
with many different companies offering ‘solutions’ that can be used by
both the private and the public sector in order to prevent and detect
several types of criminal activity. In most cases the software is custom-
made to detect speciﬁc activity (such as software for spotting money
laundering). In other cases, particularly useful for large-scale criminal
operations, software is being used to determine the structure (and hier-
archy) of criminal organizations and to create a platform where different
individuals can collaborate in this process, contributing with different
data objects, allowing for an online distributed collaborative effort. Soft-
ware has even been used to screen inmates in prison and their inter-
actions with visitors, attempting to prevent further criminality by
monitoring and deconstructing the ‘support criminal network’ of
inmates on the outside in order to infer further suspects.
While simple surveillance can be found in police databases throughout
the world, where image/voice recognition and real-time video monitor-
ing is taking place in order to locate suspects, a notable shift is taking
place in attempting to monitor the social context in which criminals
operate. The more open habitat of information availability lends itself as
an excuse to such projects. Monitoring includes close business associates
and family members, recognizing that there is a network of support
through which serious criminality operates and that the very monitoring
of such a network could provide new opportunities for preventing further
criminal activities. The social networking dimension of preventing and
detecting criminal activity is yet another testament of the need to capture
the mobility of criminals and their networks and to consider action plans
through international efforts. The chapter now turns to the key example
33 J. Kallinikos, ‘Reopening the Black Box of Technology: Artifacts and Human Agency’, in
Twenty-Third International Conference on Information Systems (2002).
34 M. Hildebrandt and S. Gutwirth, Proﬁling the European Citizen: Cross-Disciplinary
Perspectives (Berlin: Springer, 2008).
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of AML in order to discuss these issues, before presenting a theoretical
framework for considering the different information dimensions that
interact in the operation of technology against criminality.
IS in tackling money laundering and implications
for countering the ﬁnancing of terrorism
The integration of technology in the ﬁght against money laundering is
one of the ﬁnest examples where data growth, proﬁling, the technological
construction of criminality, and national/international implications can
be brought together. The volume of transacting data that needs to be
monitored, coupled with the requirements of proﬁling such a complex
behaviour, creates interesting dynamics.
First of all, ﬁnancial institutions have to cope with a staggering volume
of data. For instance, one large ﬁnancial institution in the UK deals with
about 15–20 million transactions per day. Checking those transactions
for money laundering-related behaviour over a period of time (typically
for a three-month timeframe) becomes a difﬁcult proﬁling exercise. The
vast mass of data creates a unique challenge: the development of proﬁling
queries (i.e., a series of conditional statements) that will be applied to the
totality of these data with the aim of identifying suspects for money
laundering. In this process there is an attempt to exploit possible rela-
tionships between the data and to uncover transacting anomalies or
patterns of transacting that would have a high probability of being the
traces of launderers. One problem that arises here lies in the construction
of the proﬁling queries themselves: are the relationships uncovered by
proﬁling meaningful? Or is it simply that the relationships are imposed
by the proﬁling queries in the ﬁrst place?
Regulators generally ignored these issues. Technology was introduced
hastily. Financial regulators around the world wanted banks to deploy
transaction-monitoring systems so that they could identify potential
money launderers and report them to the authorities (e.g., DP22 in the
UK35). With money laundering tied to serious primary criminal offences
35 With Discussion Paper 22 (also known as DP22), the Financial Services Authority (now
disbanded and organized otherwise) in the UK, kick-started the suggestion that regulated
entities should incorporate ‘automated monitoring systems’ according to the complexity
of their business, number of branches, functionality required, IT infrastructure, etc. See
more at FSA, ‘Reducing Money Laundering Risk – Know Your Customer and Anti-
Money Laundering Monitoring’, (2004) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/
dp22.pdf, at 18–21.
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(such as drug and human trafﬁcking), the potential that technology could
deliver seemed enormous. Hence, ﬁnancial institutions globally were
forced into a swift adoption of AML software. The software industry
around AML, proﬁling, fraud, AML training, compliance, and so on,
boomed in the 1990s. However, the unintended consequences were many
and diverse, both in the application of the software and their side effects at
the domestic level.
An example from a real bank in the EuropeanUnion area will help clarify
the issue at hand. The ﬁnancial institution under consideration bought an
off-the-shelf software platform. Following the installation of the software
and after months of customization efforts, the software produced about
2,000 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) per day. But while the SARs were
coming in the thousands, manual analysis of the reports bymoney launder-
ing analysts was limited to roughly one hundred SARs per day. The restwere
considered white noise, an obstacle to the method of producing real suspi-
cious reports. After the software had supposedly done its job in producing
suspects for money laundering, human decision making took over. Money
laundering analysts were called to decide which of those technology-
generated cases were truly suspicious. The result was a numerical percentage
that is known as the True Positive Rate (TPR). Such a number characterizes
the effectiveness of every proﬁling technique. This rate indicates what
percentage of the software-generated suspicious reports were considered
as actually suspicious following the manual examination of the reports by
analysts. For instance, if the software generates 100 suspects for money
laundering, following which due diligence and manual analysis of the
suspects ﬁnds that only one out of 100 is considered to be truly suspicious
(based on human judgement), then the TPR would be 1 per cent. In
ﬁnancial institution under examination this number was approximately
0.02 per cent. Of course, while this percentage of the TPR is extremely
disappointing, it is far from unusual. In fact, most ﬁnancial institutions start
off with TPRs at this range and graduallymanage to increase them (to about
15–25 per cent) after years of optimizing the queries that simulate how a
money laundering suspect would transact. Even so, this means that tech-
nology is generating 75 per cent false suspects for money laundering, at a
best-case scenario. These cases that are mistakenly considered as suspect
cases are known as false positives.
Despite all the computational expertise that is on parade and the
evolution in constructing supposedly sophisticated algorithms for tracing
suspicious transactions for money laundering, the unintended conse-
quences escalate to cause problems at both national and international
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levels. The fear of ﬁnancial ﬁnes for non-compliance (a recent example is
HSBC, which was ﬁned $1.9 billion for non-compliance with money
laundering regulations36) has led to a reckless use of such technology.
Even with some ﬁnancial institutions increasing the number of their staff
members six-fold to cope with the analysis of the technology-generated
suspects, the volume of alerts wasmuch greater. This has resulted in a ‘hot-
potato syndrome’: ﬁnancial institutions would pass on technology-
generated suspects to the national authorities (the Financial Intelligence
Units (FIU)) and these in turn will often request assistance from other
jurisdictions where ﬁnancial activities are linked to criminality in other
countries. Hence, the volume of data and the reckless use of technology
have led to an increasing number of computer-generated suspects, passed
on to FIU, which were swamped with white noise instead of useful infor-
mation. This phenomenon has been behind the considerable increase in
the number of SARs collected at a national level. Examples of this increase
for the UK and the USA can be viewed in Figures 7.1 and 7.2.
The increased volume of SARs available to the authorities resulted in
the quality of information being jeopardized,37 accompanied by very low
prosecution rates. Similarly, the results in asset recovery have been
horrendously poor. In the UK, this led in the past to the dismantling of
the Asset Recovery Agency (ARA) after it became known that the cost of
investigation for conﬁscating £40 million (out of an estimated £1.5 billion
laundered annually)38 was £400 million. While at the macro-level the
36 A. Viswanatha and B. Wolf, ‘HSBC to Pay $1.9 Billion U.S. Fine in Money-Laundering
Case’, Reuters (2012), available at www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/11/us-hsbc-probe-
idUSBRE8BA05M20121211.
37 A severe and direct consequence was experienced as a result of the above practices,
mostly referring here to the issue of over-reporting. The databases of Financial Intelli-
gence Units (i.e., the organizations responsible for collecting the SARs for money
laundering) were ﬁlled with white-noise. Instead of useful information that could initiate
an investigation and even a prosecution of money laundering, the FIUs ended up
receiving useless information. In all these processes, technology has played an important
role because it gave the tool to the ﬁnancial institutions to report excessively. It was
speciﬁcally this problem that led – much later – to the introduction of the risk-based
approach in the Third Directive of the European Union. That introduction alone is meant
to reduce the compliance-fear experienced by the majority of ﬁnancial institutions
(accompanied with a series of ﬁnancial ﬁnes for non-compliance) and indirectly to
maximize the potential for useful submissions of SARs. Nevertheless, despite the inten-
tions, this approach has led to considerable confusion because of the ambiguities intrinsic
in the concept of risk itself.
38 BBC, ‘Assets Recovery Failing’, (2006) available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
politics/5077846.stm.
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system has become ineffective, at the micro-level the question is why it is
so difﬁcult to model money laundering. Why is technology causing so
many problems across a wide number of stakeholders in AML (and not
just ﬁnancial institutions)? Furthermore, how should IS be considered in
light of an increasing demand to establish international cooperation for
tackling criminality while taking security, privacy and civil liberties into
consideration?
With IS, data are stored in the databases of ﬁnancial institutions and
other stakeholders. The difﬁculties in monitoring can be attributed to a
number of factors. Firstly, databases degrade and their information value
deteriorates due to human error and non-updated information. Secondly,
the complexity of the phenomenon cannot be easily encapsulated in a
computer model; ﬁnancial information is a proxy to other types of
behaviours (e.g., lifestyle that involves singularities) that are also import-
ant but which are not susceptible to a mathematical representation.
Thirdly, ﬁnancial institutions have access to a fragmented view of trans-
acting behaviour, given that customers/suspects may engage in a much
broader spectrum of ﬁnancial transacting through other institutions (and
quite often, in other jurisdictions).
Therefore, when a ﬁnancial institution reports a SAR for money
laundering or terrorist ﬁnancing it identiﬁes a potential suspect (or group
of suspects) and sends the identity information to the national authority
(i.e., the FIU) along with a record of transactions. The FIU has several
options. It can either request additional information from the initial
reporting entity (e.g., all transaction data from the account opening), or
seek additional information from all other ﬁnancial institutions for the
individual(s) involved. Then it has to wait until it receives a response
from the reporting entities and examine whether the collected infor-
mation constitutes a real money laundering case that can be forwarded
for prosecution.
In the totality of a national AML system, the above information
workﬂow can be viewed as both time-consuming and random. Suspicion
emerges as an outcome even with only a shadow of the totality of infor-
mation being available (at national level). Decentralized databases that
are scattered in various ﬁnancial institutions are pieces of the puzzle for
identifying suspects for money laundering. A logical next step would seek
national access to ﬁnancial data, with regulators and mostly FIUs
demanding some sort of access. This is the situation in Italy where the
Italian FIU receives all the raw ﬁnancial transaction data from all ﬁnan-
cial institutions in the country. This is done after the transactions are
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anonymized and the original identity information is kept at the reporting
institution. What is sent to the FIU is a proxy-identiﬁer (say an ID
number that has been modiﬁed). Still, it gives the opportunity to the
FIU to store the data in a single database, known as the Archivio Unico
Informatico and connect with the same identiﬁers transactions from
individuals throughout the country and in different institutions.
Needless to say, an advanced information exchange structure that would
support the international effort against money laundering does not exist in
this sense. IS that are currently available for the exchange of information
between different countries are in use (e.g., through the Egmont Group,
Interpol, etc.), but these involve cases on speciﬁc suspects. By doing so, they
lack in one major aspect: they do not allow the collective information that is
spread out in different countries to be used for the emergence of suspicion
itself. This is where the serious cases of criminality can be found and where
organized crime distributes its own information-footprint to avoid detec-
tion. In the closing section of this chapter we will see how such a framework
can be considered for the exchange of information at an international level
for tackling criminality. This constitutes a theoretical contribution that
applies to different types of criminal activity, and even though privacy
considerations are not examined in detail they are taken into account by
introducing layers of civil rights protection mechanisms.
While the use of technology in centralized environments inhibits
security risks, it also needs to be pointed out that the transition from
more data to both more and useful information is not straightforward.
Complexity always ﬁnds a way around any system, and as a property of
any system, complexity is a transcendental property. It may change form
and shape or even philosophical underpinnings, but hardly ever loses its
characteristics as complexity. In this manner and when considering
technology as an assistant in the tackling of criminality at the inter-
national level, we need to recognize that a series of transitions occur. For
instance, when there is an effort to monitor money laundering behaviour
logical complexity transforms into mathematical complexity, then into
algorithmic complexity, followed by proﬁling complexity and even into
visual complexity while data visualization is employed to examine large
datasets. From a systems theoretical approach no system can escape the
intrinsic complexity of the elements that constitute it.39
39 N. Luhmann, ‘Deconstruction as Second-Order Observing’, in W. Rasch (ed.), Theories of
Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 2002) at 94–112.
214 demetis
Comp. by: Amoudha Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 7 Title Name: BANTEKASandMYLONAKI
Date:16/7/14 Time:19:19:10 Page Number: 215
The aforementioned remarks point towards an important distinction
that remains central to the role of technology in all efforts against
international and transnational crime. Technology is often viewed out-
side of its organizational implications and the consequences that are
created when an automated function (like that of technology) re-arranges
the already-present bureaucracy of organizations. This is only part of the
problem. Technology is also viewed as a solution that – when imposed
onto the problem domain – will somehow ameliorate the difﬁculties of
spotting criminal behaviour. Such a belief is ﬂawed because it does not
consider the contextual use of technology. The integration of technology
within an organizational setting has implications that stretch beyond the
best of intentions/expectations of computer programmers.
When it comes to any type of technology being embedded within an
organizational setting these contingencies give rise to an emergent infor-
mation system. This interacts with the pre-established basis of other IS
and at the same time it constructs part of the organizational reality
through which modern institutions attempt to combat criminal activity.
A theoretical framework for the use of IS in tackling criminality
In the development of the theoretical framework that follows there are a
number of dimensions that need to be considered before the role of IS
can be more speciﬁcally laid down. These are presented as distinct
dimensions below and reﬂections on their synthesis are provided at the
end of this chapter following the presentation of Figure 7.3. Money
laundering is occasionally being used here as an example, without this
jeopardizing the generality of the framework.
The goal for outlining this framework is to develop an overview of
considerations regarding technology-supported information exchanges
for tackling criminality. A number of distinctions and categories are used
in order to highlight the different monitoring possibilities. These start
with data-speciﬁc processes and move onto semantic issues, classiﬁca-
tions, as well as possibilities for the exchange of information. Reﬂections
are provided in each dimension in relation to the context in which they
are being discussed.
Dimension 1: types of data
The type of data being monitored is possibly one of the most interesting
starting viewpoints for the purposes of proﬁling. Generally, ﬁve data types
can be distinguished: text, number, audio, image and video. Video can be
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considered in tandem with the image data-type as it constitutes a consecu-
tive time-sequence of images. In the dimension that we can call ‘types of
data’ there are also possibilities for combinations. For instance, data can
include both text and audio. Different combinations yield a different infor-
mation value, while data manipulation, recognition and analysis become
harder as the data represent more media-rich objects (like video).
Dimension 2: channels of communication
Supported by cable, satellite or terrestrial technologies, data are commu-
nicated between individuals, or between individuals and institutions in all
different data types. Basic channels of communication, such as radio, the
telephone or the Internet are routinely used to allow for the types of data
to be exchanged between users. Depending on the technology used and
the medium of exchange (e.g., use of the Internet for exchanging emails)
data are stored in different ways or may not be stored at all.
Dimension 3: approach to data capture, storage and monitoring
Unless actively monitored for crime prevention purposes, there are data
types in certain communication channels that may not be captured or
stored at all (e.g., telephone calls). In this scenario their information value
extracting
D5 - Anti-criminal value of data
D6 - The filtering of data
D7 - Institutional level of analysis
Generation of suspects for criminal behaviour
D2-Channels of
communication
DI-Types of Data
TEXT  NUMBER  AUDIO  IMAGE  VIDEO
+(Combinations)
D3-Approach to data capture, storage & monitoring
D4-Private & public data
Figure 7.3: A framework for the technological construction of criminality and the
generation of suspicion
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is lost immediately. But the transition from analogue to digital, as well as
the economies of scale that have made data storage cheap, now means
that data are increasingly being captured and stored for longer periods of
time. The actual depth and storage of data are difﬁcult to dissect, but
recent revelations in the USA about the activities of the National Security
Agency point to very ambitious programs whose aim is to collect data
indiscriminately. If we exclude the intelligence community that focuses
on national security rather than the full spectrum of criminal activity,
then data are captured by two distinct approaches that inﬂuence the
dynamics of proﬁling in relation to the approach for data monitoring.
The ﬁrst one is a ‘collect all’ approach that can be considered as more
invasive from a privacy perspective. In this case the strategy for the
monitoring of data is decided a posteriori from its collection. Both public
and private data may be collected. The second approach to data collec-
tion and monitoring is a ‘pre-ﬁlter’ approach. What data are actually
collected is decided on the basis of what is explicitly required in order for
particular monitoring processes to be accomplished. For example, if
terrorist activity is being monitored on a particular telecommunication
channel (e.g., telephone) then keywords that may raise suspicion (e.g.,
bomb) can isolate certain communications for further analysis. Finally,
there are hybrid approaches between the two, of which a good example is
Echelon (the international electronic eavesdropping network run by the
intelligence communities of the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand). While it is not considered to be a real-time tapping network, it
captures trafﬁc and then ﬁlters it for speciﬁc keywords that are seman-
tically considered to be associated with suspicious behaviour. Intercep-
tions are considered to take place through terrestrial radio antennae that
intercept satellite transmissions.
Dimension 4: private or public data
Data that can be used during a proﬁling process may include both private
and public data. Private data reside in databases that have restricted
access to a select number of users. For instance, the raw transaction data
stored in the databases of ﬁnancial institutions are proprietary. Only
personnel that are designated to have access to bank transaction data
can gain access (excluding security breaches, of course), as well as
authorities that demand access in the course of speciﬁc investigations.
Aggregate collection of such private data by authorities is considered to
be more invasive but there are ways to alleviate some concerns.
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Anonymization and PETs can be used at that level so that individual
identity data become stripped off the data that will be manipulated.40
In addition, there exist public data that can be (and usually are) used in
proﬁling. Public data are considered to be available in a format that is
accessible to all and is most recently propelled by the use of the Internet
and a number of social media in which people participate. But what is
surprising about this is that people will willingly share a great deal of
information about themselves in order to participate in an online plat-
form. If we take Facebook as an example, then users usually upload
information about their hobbies, age, current location, activities, marital
status, personal interests and preferences (what they like), what they
read, what they share and who they are connected to. While all of this
information may not necessarily be in the public domain automatically
(depending on the privacy settings of the user) it does demonstrate how
users react to having their personal information online.
The value of that public social networking information for countering
criminality is notable. In a number of cases, the police have already used
such data for monitoring individuals during ongoing investigations. In
this way, social networking information has ‘anti-criminal value’.41
Dimension 5: the anti-criminal value of data
Regardless of whether data are stored on known criminals, simple
suspects, or non-criminals, data are known to possess an anti-criminal
value or dimension. As discussed in relation to Europol IS, there are
different ways in which technology can be used. In the case of known
criminals, their personal data are stored and shared so that they can be
arrested. In the case of suspects, data are shared, corroborated and
40 See V. Senicar, B. Jerman-Blazic and T. Klobucar, ‘Privacy-Enhancing Technologies –
Approaches and Development’, (2003) 25 Computer Standards & Interfaces 147. Privacy
mechanisms like PETs include: encryption and steganography (hiding signals inside
other signals), blind digital signature, trust centres (TTPs, certiﬁcation services, etc.),
identity protectors (these generate pseudo-identities as needed, convert pseudo-identities
into actual identities desired, and combat fraud and misuse of the system), cookie
management software, anonymizers, re-mailers, a system called Crowds, Crypto-Heaven,
etc. Projects researching and developing PETs are P3P (by W3C), Privacy Incorporated
Software Agent (PISA), Roadmap for Advanced Research in Privacy and Identity Man-
agement (RAPID), and the EU GUIDES project.
41 K. Knibbs, ‘In the Online Hunt for Criminals, Social Media Is the Ultimate Snitch’,
(2013) available at www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/the-new-inside-source-for-
police-forces-social-networks/.
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additional data objects are required to establish criminal acts. But as
already discussed in the previous sections there is also an anti-criminal
value in the data traces of non-criminals, if only to establish a distinc-
tion between criminal/non-criminal for statistical/demographic/socio-
economic purposes. It is on the basis of such distinctions that criminal
behaviour is supposedly understood: as an anomaly within an otherwise
predictable system of norms. Then it is believed that there is some sort
of structure in the anomaly itself, a series of behavioural patterns that
can be absorbed into algorithmic queries, and that in this process non-
criminal data can establish a ﬁrmer ground upon which the antithesis
can be considered.
Dimension 6: the ﬁltering of data
The ﬁltering of data takes place through a ‘ﬁlter’ that constitutes a series
of queries that attempt to encapsulate suspicious behaviour. The purpose
of the ﬁlter is to raise an alarm for speciﬁc transactions in respect of a
particular crime. The ﬁlter contains the algorithmic expressions that
attempt to capture suspicious behaviour for different criminal activity
(e.g., money laundering, terrorist ﬁnancing, fraud, identity theft, etc.)
and, as it is applied to the data, it also reduces the original population of
the data to a supposedly manageable subset. For example, in the context
of AML, a ﬁnancial institution can apply a ﬁlter to raw transaction data;
the ﬁlter describes in algorithmic terms how the potential money laun-
derer would transact and would deliver suspects for further manual
analysis. Alternatively, if the analysis were to take place at a national
authority (an FIU) that aggregates transactions from all ﬁnancial insti-
tutions, other proﬁles can be used. The function of the ﬁlter is to model
(in algorithmic queries) the basic characteristics that can trace a criminal
phenomenon by exploring the data. Hence, different ﬁlters are required
to model different phenomena: money laundering, terrorist ﬁnancing,
imminent terrorist attacks, etc., by exploring both public and private
data, different channels of communication, types of data, storage and
semantic tagging techniques, etc. Enhancing these proﬁles for capturing
criminal behaviour in more accurate terms is the most critical challenge
that institutions face. Of course, this is inhibited by the complexity of the
phenomena being studied and their underground activity, as well as the
volume of data that is at the heart of the problem (but also the scope for
opportunity).
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Dimension 7: the institutional level of analysis
There are three institutional levels of analysis where technology can
participate in order to extract anti-criminal value from data: the local
level where institutions have proprietary databases (e.g., banks), the
national level (e.g., FIUs) where institutions can demand access (or data)
from the local level, and the international level where national insti-
tutions typically collaborate by exchanging data on speciﬁc cases and
advancing shared intelligence (as in the cases of Europol and Interpol).
However, the proﬁling element at the international level is considerably
more restricted due to data restrictions and privacy concerns. While this
is both understandable and desirable there are ways to include both
anonymization and PETs in order to elevate proﬁling practices towards
an international scope. These would target criminal activity that has a
truly international dimension and where the silos of nation states restrict
a timely response to targeting criminality.
Dimension 8: time
While not included in Figure 7.3, time plays a central role throughout
any modelling problem. Even though time can be considered as one of
the most elusive dimensions, in the context of using technology for
combating criminal activities there are some important time-
classiﬁcations that are relevant. Three different time-horizons can be
distinguished: real-time proﬁling, near-real-time, and batch processing
of data. Real-time monitoring is critical in the cases of known criminals
that still escape arrest or are monitored for other purposes. For example,
the process of embedding terrorist suspects in lists such as the one
published by the US Treasury’s Ofﬁce of Foreign Assets Control requires
an immediate response if said individuals attempt to carry out any
transactions. Financial institutions are required to block their transac-
tions immediately. In respect of decisions that can be delayed enough for
human intervention one can move into the category of near-real-time
monitoring. Finally, the time horizon can be explored in a more relaxed
manner in the context of batch processing. In this scenario, data is
examined for its anti-criminal information value in certain timeframes
where proﬁles and ﬁlters are applied to the data. For instance, in AML
transaction-monitoring software this timeframe is typically a three-
month window. As some criminal activity like money laundering is
spread out over time in particular typologies (e.g., smurﬁng – or breaking
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up large amounts of money to be laundered into smaller sums and
depositing them just under the reporting thresholds) the time horizon
for engaging in proﬁling is critical. Obviously, the bigger the timeframe
to be used the greater the challenge in data manipulation.
Conclusions
Technology occupies an important role in the ﬁght against transnational
criminality and there is little doubt that it will continue in an enabling role
in communicating data and applying proﬁling practices. A number of IS
inﬂuences have been discussed in the context of this chapter and it is
important to stress that more theoretical work is necessary in order to
delineate part of the complex nexus of effects that technology imposes in
the ﬁght against criminal activity. The continuous challenges that are faced
in the ﬁght against transnational criminality will require novel consider-
ations and governmental action to apply PETs for curbing the invasive
character of data manipulation that proposes a ‘collect all’ approach.
Similarly, researchers that ﬁnd themselves at the boundary between
technology and the law will need to investigate further the legal implica-
tions arising from those technological implementations whose bottom-up
approach counteracts existing law. This involves the realization that tech-
nology does not always function as a subordinate tool with strictly deﬁned
conditions but assumes a systemic role. By doing so it maintains categor-
ical assumptions and distinctions between criminal/non-criminal rela-
tions and these are propelled by automation to acquire a more synthetic
role. The technological construction of criminality (or of criminal reality) as
laid down in this chapter denotes precisely this conditioning.
Of course, the challenges that remain in the international dimension of
tackling criminality are manifold and will continue to evolve. In this
regard, it is important to emphasize again that the technological role of
data sharing and collaborative work remains central and needs to be
enhanced. But at the same time the emergence of suspicion by proﬁling
through international collaborations constitutes an important step to be
explored. The several dimensions discussed above, each entailing a
number of other elements, illustrate that the role of technology is critical.
While technology allows for the distributed communication of data, the
processes that participate in extracting anti-criminal value from said data
are more subtle; and it is in this context that fascinating new develop-
ments may occur and must be pursued.
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